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Abstract The organisation of health care is rapidly changing. There is a trend to 
move away from individual health care institutions towards transmural integrated 
care and interorganizational collaboration in networks. However, within such col-
laboration and network there is often likely to be a pluralism of values as different 
health care institutions often have very different values. For this paper, we exam-
ine three different models of how we believe institutions can come to collaborate 
in networks, and thus reap the potential benefits of such collaboration, despite hav-
ing different moral beliefs or values. A first way is the pragmatic way in which the 
different health care institutions avoid ethical reflection and focus on solutions. A 
second possible route is that of consensus where health care institutions base their 
collaboration on values that they all share. The third, and final, approach is that of 
compromise. Although moral compromise is often seen in a negative light, we argue 
that in many cases compromise might be necessary and ethically justified. In a final 
section, we will shift our focus from discussing various theoretical methods to allow 
collaboration to the potential content of consensus or compromise.
Keywords Health care network · Collaboration · Consensus · Compromise · 
Pragmatism
 * Kasper Raus 
 Kasper.Raus@UZGent.be
1 Ghent University Hospital, Ghent University, Corneel Heymanslaan 10, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
2 Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent 
University, Ghent, Belgium
3 Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
4 Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Department of Public Health, Ghent University, 
Ghent, Belgium
 Health Care Anal
1 3
Introduction
In the organisation of health care, there is a trend to move away from individual 
health care institutions towards transmural integrated care and interorganizational 
collaboration [28, 51]. The drivers of this trend towards integration and collabora-
tion can be political, economic, ideological, pragmatic, etc. What exactly drives such 
collaboration between health care institutions differs significantly between health 
care systems, but the trend is undeniable. Across all systems, hopes are high for inte-
grated care and health care networks (HCNs) which have been argued to potentially 
increase economic efficiency [10] or improve the quality of patient care [31].
There are also possible barriers. Forming HCNs requires at least some form of 
agreement on moral values or policies, as failing to do so could threaten the suc-
cess or sustainability of the network when ethical conflicts arise [33]. Many, if not 
most, of the policy issues in an institutional health care context have a clear ethical 
or normative component. Examples may include policy on issues related to abortion 
or care at the end of life (e.g. withholding or withdrawing treatment and physician 
assisted dying). However, disagreements between institutions need not be limited 
to issues surrounding medical procedures and can involve, for example, policy on 
wearing and displaying religious symbols.
Moral agreement between health care institutions is far from self-evident as they 
often have very different missions, values and ethical norms. While health care sys-
tems have a legal framework setting the legal boundaries for collaboration, this is 
unlikely to do away with moral conflict as laws often leave room for interpretation 
and application. There exist a number of different reasonably acceptable views on 
the organisation and performance of health care and thus a ‘fact of pluralism’ [42].
For this paper, we want to examine three different models of how we believe 
institutions can come to collaborate in networks, and thus reap the potential benefits 
of such collaboration, despite having different moral beliefs or values. A first way to 
handle pluralism of values is the pragmatic way which involves restricting oneself to 
concrete disagreements and practical solutions. A second way is to build a common 
HCN perspective based on consensus between the network partners. The third way 
is to engage in moral compromise which involves mutual concessions.
We focus on agreement between institutions on values, principles, protocols and/
or procedures on the meso-level of the network or the organizations of which the net-
work consists. Although interesting, ethical issues at the macro-level (e.g. resource 
allocation within society at large) or micro-level (e.g. individual moral decisions by 
health care professionals) fall outside the scope of this paper.
Health Care Networks and the Health Care Institutions that Make Up 
Such Networks
Before we proceed with our analysis, a few remarks are in order about our use of the 
concepts HCNs and health care institutions.
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We use ‘health care institution’ as a broad concept which can refer to any public 
or private organization that provides health care or related services. This includes 
hospitals, but might also include such organizations as hospices, elderly care homes, 
primary care organizations, etc. As we focus on interorganisational collaboration, 
we do exclude parts of health care institutions such as particular departments. This 
broad approach accords well with the increasing focus on integrated care where the 
various health care services are not seen as completely separate, but are provided in 
a more coordinated and integrated way [34].
The emphasis on health care institutions is key to the approach taken in this paper. 
The primary focus lies on health care institutions as institutions rather than on a 
particular set of people that make up or represent those institutions. We will thus 
throughout the paper talk about health care institutions as being able to compromise 
or reach consensus. This implies we take the institution to have both some form of 
stable (moral) identity and a capacity for (moral) agency, although we acknowledge 
that this is the topic of considerable debate [17, 38, 49].
Dealing with this issue at length would go beyond the scope of this paper. We do 
however, believe our approach is justified. First, it allows us to focus on the forma-
tion of networks without overly complicating our analysis with forces and considera-
tions that are at play within the individual organizations. We assume that in discus-
sions about forming a HCN, individual institutions will come forward as a more 
or less single entity. Second, health care institutions are likely to meet several of 
what we consider essential criteria for identity or agency. In his important work on 
compromise, for example, Benjamin [6] distinguishes three structural conditions for 
identity: (1) a relatively stable set of values and beliefs, (2) verbal communication 
of those values and beliefs and (3) behaviour which corresponds with those values. 
Health care institutions meet these conditions as they arguably produce both policy 
documents pronouncing particular values and make policy decisions based on such 
values. As an example, some work has been done on Catholic hospital identity [43, 
45].
Such health care institutions can collaborate and form HCNs, which we take 
to involve ‘groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work 
together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal’ [39]. Com-
pared to bilateral collaborations, networks are often amorphous and involve a com-
plex set of interactions between the various members of that networks. They can 
thus take many different forms and be governed in a wide variety of ways [2, 39].
How and why such networks are formed can differ significantly from health sys-
tem to health systems and significantly influences the necessity to cooperate. In 
some countries, governmental policy requires hospitals or other health care insti-
tutions to form networks. In Belgium, for example, the government is planning to 
require every hospital to become part of a larger hospital network, although the 
choice of network members is largely free. In other health systems formation of net-
works might not be legally required in which case networks will be formed on more 
voluntary basis. Even in such a system forming networks might still be a necessity 
in many cases for, for example, economic reasons. However, the point is that regard-
less of whether a particular network is formed for policy reasons, economic reasons 
or on voluntary basis, for the network to operate successfully the members of that 
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network will have to find a way to find agreement. In this paper we will analyse 
three such ways.
Who the members of a particular network are, is also of relevance. A HCN 
involving only private for-profit institutions encounters different issues (e.g. com-
petition issues) than do networks involving only public health care institutions (e.g. 
NHS hospitals in the UK) or networks involving both private and public institutions.
Bearing in mind this wide diversity of networks is important. When analysing the 
three models of collaboration, we argue that no model is inherently or automatically 
superior to the other models. Rather, which model for collaboration is best suited for 
a specific network depends on the health system one operates in and the composition 
of the network
Pragmatism and ‘Muddling Through’
One evident way of dealing with differences of opinion within a network such as a 
HCN could be to not engage in a comprehensive reflection, but to instead deal with 
concrete issues as they arise. This could be linked to ‘muddling through’ [30]. It is 
possible that HCNs involving members with different moral opinions function suc-
cessfully in absence of comprehensive agreement.
Theoretically, this seems to be linked to the philosophical tradition of Pragma-
tism. Historically the tradition of Pragmatism relates to the works of the classic 
American Pragmatists Charles Sanders Pierce, William James and John Dewey, 
but more contemporary philosophers such as Hillary Putnam and Richard Rorty 
can also be considered pragmatists. Central to the Pragmatist tradition is the idea 
that hypotheses and propositions are best assessed in terms of their practical con-
sequences rather than on their truth or falsehood. Pragmatists note that focussing 
on falsity and truth has brought us no closer to resolving certain philosophical (or 
other) debates but has, quite to the contrary, fuelled unnecessary debate. For Prag-
matist thinkers, ‘unless some practical difference would follow from one of the other 
side’s being correct, the dispute is idle’ [25].
The theory can be easily applied to the health care context, for example in debates 
concerning abortion. Central to the debate on abortion is the question of person-
hood, i.e. the question of whether or not embryos and foetuses are human persons 
who deserve the same protection as any other human being. A pragmatist thinker 
might note that despite centuries of debate, this discussion has not been resolved and 
propose shifting the debate towards the practical consequences of adopting a certain 
stance on personhood. Granting personhood to foetuses from the moment of concep-
tion in effect makes any abortion a form of murder, whereas denying personhood 
throughout the entire pregnancy might in effect justify abortion up until the time of 
delivery. Hospitals could then opt for the position that offers the best practical con-
sequences, thereby abstracting from its truth or falsity. This theoretical model has 
also been applied to the ethics of ‘workarounds’, being pragmatic fixes to deal with 
moral problems in health care systems [7].
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In Practice
Pragmatism is a result oriented approach which involves examining whether par-
ticular solutions to a moral conflict would be acceptable to all members of the net-
work. This might be the case without them agreeing on why this solution is accept-
able. If so, further debate is idle as which side holds the truth makes no practical 
difference. The pragmatic approach thus assumes that comprehensive ethical debate 
is only relevant when there is disagreement on which way to go.
In practice, one could imagine institutions within a HCN having very different 
beliefs about the acceptability of physician-assisted dying (where this practice is 
legal). Whereas one institution believes it to be ethically justified another institution 
is adamantly opposed to it. Instead of debating the truth or falsity of these beliefs, 
these institutions might examine which position has the best practical consequences, 
thereby reaching the agreement that patients with a request for euthanasia are trans-
ferred to the institution more favourable towards euthanasia. The health care institu-
tion opposed to euthanasia could perhaps agree with this solution as they would not 
be required to change their stance on assisted suicide and euthanasia and would not 
have to perform it within their institutional walls. The other institution could agree 
on grounds that this arrangement would make sure that patients who want eutha-
nasia (and fulfil all legal criteria) can indeed receive it. Also, if one considers the 
example of the network containing only public health care institutions which are 
part of the same larger health care system, it is clear that such an arrangement might 
not raise systemic ethical issues.
However, as we will mention below, such a solution might raise various other 
ethical issues (e.g. the issue of complicity). The approach is unlikely to be suited 
for networks containing health care institutions with fundamentally different moral 
beliefs (e.g. a network containing both religiously affiliated and non-religiously affil-
iated hospitals).
Discussion
There are evident advantages to this pragmatist approach. It could allow network 
members to reach agreement more quickly than they would if they were attempt-
ing to reconcile fundamental moral beliefs. It might also allow network members to 
hold on to particular beliefs as the pragmatist approach allows institutions to adopt 
positions based on practical consequences and not truth. As such this might be a 
fruitful approach for particular networks.
However, there are considerable risks. First, there is the issue of whether it is 
conceivable or desirable for institution to abstract from the truth or falsity of their 
beliefs. What constitutes a good practical consequence is determined by one’s moral 
beliefs. If an institution believes euthanasia is morally wrong, they are likely to dis-
approve of a position that leads to euthanasia being performed more. They are likely 
to feel morally complicit if they do, even if euthanasia is not performed within their 
institutional walls. One might not only be morally responsible for what one does, but 
also for what one agrees to or approves of.
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Second, which solution one prefers does not have to be the result of a reasonable 
reflective process, but might just as well be guided by mere intuition, emotion, cir-
cumstances, etc. There is thus no guarantee that the solution two or more institutions 
agree on is in fact ethically justified.
Third, the pragmatist method operates mainly in response to conflict. It is known 
from studies into the power relations in HCNs that a particular dominant group or 
partner might have the power to control the network agenda and, therefore, which 
conflicts surface and which stay hidden [1]. Hence a pragmatist method might play 
into the hand of the larger or more dominant partner within a HCN.
Moral Consensus
Another way to deal with pluralism of value within HCNs is to look for (overlap-
ping) consensus. Between HCN members, there might be underlying agreements 
which could serve as a basis for collaboration. The most famous theoretical model 
for consensus in philosophy and ethics is Rawls’ model of ‘overlapping consensus’ 
[41] as brought forward in his A Theory of Justice [40], but perhaps more exten-
sively in his book Political Liberalism [42]. Although mainly aimed at organizing 
political and social life, Rawls’ thinking could just as well be applied to HCNs.
In Practice
In practice, the consensus approach amounts to a search for those values on which 
consensus exists. In that respect it is broader than the pragmatic approach which 
stops at agreement on solutions.
Such an approach could be considered feasible for HCNs, especially where the 
members of that network are likely to share moral beliefs. One could imagine a 
HCN consisting of Catholic inspired health care institutions who are likely to find 
common ground in their religious affiliation. However, consensus can just as well 
be reached across ideologies, for example by referring to the goals of medicine. An 
example was given by the late pope John Paul II who said:
I hope that Catholic health care institutions and public health care institu-
tions may be able to collaborate effectively, united by the common desire to 
serve the human person, especially, the weakest and those who, in fact, are not 
socially insured [29].
In case there is no immediate consensus, there is the hope that such consensus might 
gradually grow. In the context of HCNs, some commentators argue that ‘the process 
of reaching consensus regarding values is troublesome and largely unfolds through 
the opportunity of working side-by-side’ [44: 314]. There is thus a possibility that a 
pragmatic approach to HCNs could evolve into a consensus approach.
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Discussion
Starting from a consensus has the clear advantage that the result of the consensus 
is acceptable to all parties. Within health care, certain values (e.g. patient central-
ity) are prime candidates as starting point for collaboration because they are widely 
shared among health care institutions and are often also enshrined within the legal 
framework. Reaching consensus might also bring institutions closer together by 
requiring them to focus on what binds them rather than what divides or distinguishes 
them. A consensus model allows institutions to stay true to their perceived identity 
by creating an area where institutions collaborate based on shared and agreed upon 
rules, values or principles.
Despite the obvious benefits, consensus might also have its drawbacks. For some 
commentators a true consensus is practically unfeasible, but also theoretically void 
[14, 15, 36]. In view of pluralism, the only thing there will be agreement on is likely 
to be highly abstract and/or vague. Thus, when consensus is reached, one might 
wonder how deep or superficial it is. Foster et al. [16] found substantial overlap with 
the codes of ethics of over 500 companies, with some even being identical. The 
authors suggest that many companies simply express ethical values that are common 
or popular. A similar process could take place in mission statements or codes of eth-
ics of health care institutions. For example, while hospitals might agree, as stated by 
John Paul II, on a ‘desire to serve the human person’, they might differ in their inter-
pretation of what this means in practice. If this is the case, the value of a general 
consensus is severely diminished as it is still likely to result in conflict in practice.
Moral Compromise
Compromising is another way of dealing with a plurality of values. The seemingly 
simple concept of compromise has been shown to be a rich and complex notion [6, 
19]. Initially, there seem to be three ways in which the concept of compromise is 
used: (1) compromise as betrayal; (2) compromise as a process; and (3) compromise 
as an outcome [6].
Compromise is often used to indicate betrayal. For example, we can say of a 
policeman caught stealing that his/her professional and moral integrity is compro-
mised. In the context of moral conflict, compromise has indeed been argued to be 
particularly problematic [11, 24]. One’s moral values or moral beliefs are claimed 
to be unsuited for negotiations or concessions. Although we acknowledge these 
issues, we will argue that classic barriers to moral compromise are not necessarily 
insurmountable. We will thus use the concept in a non-evaluative way in this paper. 
Although there, undoubtedly, are bad compromises, this is due to the nature of these 
compromises rather than the mere fact that they are compromises.
For this paper, we understand compromise to refer to the process of resolving 
agreement through negotiation and normative concessions or, as argued by Ben-
jamin, by ‘splitting the difference’ [6]. The outcome of that process could also be 
labelled a compromise but, unlike the process, the outcome does not necessarily 
involve mutual concessions. For example, two parties in disagreement might agree 
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to have their disagreement resolved through a decision by a third party. In this case 
the compromise lies in the fact that both parties agree beforehand to accept the deci-
sion by the third party, even if the outcome of the decision is one-sided. Therefore, 
we believe that what truly distinguishes compromise from consensus or pragmatic 
decision-making is the process rather than the outcome.
When applied to HCNs, compromise is a third strategy for handling a plurality of 
values amongst the network members. This strategy differs in one important respect 
from the previous two strategies which both start from agreement. In pragmatism 
there is agreement on solutions and in consensus there is agreement on basic prin-
ciples or values. This, in both strategies, forms a natural starting point and incentive 
for network collaboration. Compromise, by contrast, starts with disagreement and 
involves reaching some degree of agreement. What can incentivize network mem-
bers to nevertheless contemplate compromise as a strategy for collaboration? We 
believe in some cases collaboration between health care institutions can be required 
and/or desirable, even while there is insufficient agreement for a pragmatic solution 
or consensus. In such a case, as remarked by Benjamin [6] compromise can be con-
sidered as a strategy for ‘preserving continuing, cooperative relationships’, which 
might be beneficial all things considered. It is increasingly being acknowledged that 
integrated care and interorganisational collaboration can greatly benefit patients 
[18], communities and even society at large [34]. Health care institutions arguably 
have an obligation to further not only their own interests, but also those of patients, 
the community they operate in and the society of which they are part. In such cases 
if there is consensus between institutions on cooperation as a beneficial goal, but 
insufficient agreement for a consensus approach as a means to achieve that goal, 
this could incentivize members to consider compromise as a means to nevertheless 
achieve cooperation.
Barriers to Compromise in Health Care Networks
We acknowledge that compromise as a strategy for collaboration nevertheless faces 
considerable barriers of which we will discuss the two main ones.
(a) Ethical values as constitutive of (corporate) identity and integrity
One of the reasons why compromise on moral beliefs, values or norms is difficult is 
that these are often constitutive of one’s identity [13]. Hence one does not subscribe 
to a certain ideology and have certain values, but rather one has particular values 
because one subscribes to a particular ideology. Compromising on certain deeply 
felt ethical beliefs, values and norms could then be felt as a betrayal of one’s identity 
and thus as a loss of moral integrity. Moral integrity for individuals is widely recog-
nized in the health care context and forms the justification for conscientious objects 
whereby a health care professional refuses to assist or perform in a certain medical 
act that is irreconcilable with one’s moral beliefs.
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However, for institutions the issue of moral integrity is less often discussed. Cor-
porate (or institutional) identity has often been linked to branding and marketing 
rather than moral integrity [4]. If so, an incoherent identity might for a health care 
institution be more of an image problem than an ethical issue of integrity. However, 
we think that for institutions identity should be seen as more than a mere branding 
issue. We have argued above that there are reasons for considering institutions to 
have moral identity and agency. Moreover, various institutions do highly value their 
identity and do consider some collaborations to pose threats to that identity. Wit-
ness to this fact are the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services issued by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops as recommendations to 
Catholic healthcare institutions. They remark that:
On the other hand, new partnerships can pose serious challenges to the viabil-
ity of the identity of Catholic health care institutions and services, and their 
ability to implement these Directives in a consistent way, especially when part-
nerships are formed with those who do not share Catholic moral principles 
[46].
Their recommendation, subsequently, is to only collaborate with non-Catholic 
health care institutions when collaboration with a Catholic health care institution 
is not possible. Thus when there is, relatively, free choice of partners to collaborate 
with, this very choice might already involve some form of compromise.
Similar considerations might be at work with other ideology related health care 
institutions such as, for example, Jewish hospitals [22]. For example, in 2015 when 
various Jewish hospitals were grouped in a single entity, the CEO of that entity 
subsequently proclaimed that in the future he would not compromise on the Jew-
ish character of the hospitals in the group and stated that: ‘Our culture is absolutely 
non-negotiable. Our forefathers built these institutions. They are our heritage’ [3].
(b) Non-negotiability of moral claims
Health care institutions might not be willing to compromise on moral beliefs or val-
ues because they believe them to be non-negotiable by nature. Some hospitals, for 
example, may consider life to be absolutely sacred and they might therefore have a 
complete prohibition on any form of abortion or shortening of life. Any deviation 
from that prohibition is perceived as a denial of the sanctity of life principle and they 
might therefore not be willing to collaborate with institutions that do allow these 
practices to be performed.
The principle of rationality—often considered to be an essential requirement of 
ethics—requires that if one holds a value to be true or applicable to a certain situ-
ation, one ought to hold this value true or applicable in all relevantly similar situa-
tions. Absolute moral rules leave little wiggle room. Opposing moral values, prin-
ciples or ideologies might thus stand off without there being a continuum between 
them where both parties might meet.
 Health Care Anal
1 3
In Defence of Moral Compromise
Together with several commentators [6, 26, 27, 37, 48] we argue that the barriers 
discussed above need not necessarily be insurmountable.
First, compromise is not so irreconcilable with identity or integrity as is often 
assumed. Identity is not a fixed and timeless concept, but an ever evolving entity. 
It has been argued extensively that achieving a complete and fully integrated set of 
moral values and principles is not possible [6, 48]. Constructing and maintaining 
identity should be seen as a continuous process. Health care institutions might be 
required to constantly rethink or adjust their identity in view of important changes 
in the health care. Reflecting, dialoguing and compromising with other institutions 
could and should be seen essential parts of that process. Understood in this way, 
compromising is a formative process that might build or strengthen one’s identity 
instead of destroying it. Also, within a HCN a new, higher level, identity might be 
formed.
Second, as has been noticed by many commentators, a willingness to compro-
mise can in itself be a moral principle that one avows [6, 26, 27]. It can show respect 
to the moral position of others and a willingness to ‘get things done’. In many cases 
in the health context a decision is needed and unavoidable, providing an ideal condi-
tion for compromises to become possible. As such, compromising could actually be 
evidence of one’s moral integrity.
Third, it was mentioned that many ideologies or ethical theories have non-nego-
tiable ethical claims. To fully discuss this problem would go beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, we would like to touch upon one particular issue. We argue that 
it is possible to make a distinction between the question ‘What is the best principle/
value/rule/solution?’ and ‘What is the best principle/value/rule/solution in this par-
ticular context, at this particular time within this particular community?’. The for-
mer question is the truly non-negotiable one, whereas the latter might be the topic of 
debate and varies from context to context or from time to time. Joseph Heath once 
made the parallel that if your primary preference is to fly to Hawaii and you know 
you only have fuel to get 90% of the way, the best option is not to travel 90% of the 
distance, but to choose an entirely different destination that is reachable [23]. Health 
care institutions might thus be able to compromise on a particular policy while, at 
the same time, holding on to their fundamental moral beliefs and principles [26].
In Practice
As regards the use of compromise in practice, we will examine two 
process-oriented approaches.
Habermasian Discourse Ethics
A known model for compromise is that of Discourse Ethics defended by, for exam-
ple, Habermas [20, 21]. This theory shifts focus from moral beliefs or principles to 
rational discourse and debate. The philosophical reasoning is that ethical principles 
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or truths cannot be discovered by individuals on themselves, but only through com-
municative rationality and discussion with others. Deliberation and discussion is 
not what is needed to arrive at the right answer, but is, by contrast, what makes the 
answer right. Off course, in order to function properly, there are several conditions 
that have to be met. For example, all parties must communicate in all honesty and 
must be willing to reach a solution. For Habermas true deliberation has to imply a 
willingness to alter one’s own beliefs throughout deliberation. Whereas some ethi-
cal models see others as people that have to be convinced and brought to one’s own 
perspective, Habermas sees others as potential partners in a joint quest for the truth. 
The focus lies on the process rather than the result and as such, it might be said to be 
radically opposite to the pragmatic approach discussed above.
The Habermasian method has been applied in practice. Walker and Lovat [50] 
have applied the theory to develop a model for ‘dialogic consensus in clinical deci-
sion-making’. Another method akin to discourse ethic is ‘moral case deliberation’ 
[35]. Here a group is faced with an ethical conflict and attempts to resolve this by 
going through a set of fixed phases of explanation, discussion and deliberation.
When applied to health care networking, this theory implies that network part-
ners could attempt to resolve differences through agreed upon process. Potential 
HCN members might come to agree on how ethical issues should be discussed and 
reflected on and might agree to accept whatever results from that discussion. Imag-
ine, for example, various health care institutions in a network disagreeing on how 
members of that network should respond to certain patient requests (e.g. requests 
for abortion). Although it might be impossible for them to agree on principle par-
ticular outcome, they might perhaps agree on a particular process for resolving the 
difference. This could, for example, involve the creation of a network wide ethics 
committee that contains representatives of the various institutions and certain pro-
cedures for that ethics committee. Richard Huxtable has convincingly argued for the 
possibility and the advantages of resolving moral conflicts through the use of ethics 
committees [26, 27].
(Wide) Reflective Equilibrium
A second model of moral compromise for HCNs could be the Rawlsian idea of a 
(wide) reflective equilibrium [12, 42] where the HCN attempts to arrive at a coher-
ent and justified set of moral beliefs. The goal of reflective equilibrium is to cre-
ate a balance between one’s considered moral judgements in particular cases and 
the principles one aims to uphold. If these are mutually inconsistent, for example 
when the person fails to apply a moral principle in all similar cases, she can either 
change her considered judgement or the principle she adheres to. Hence reflective 
equilibrium is a fundamentally deliberative process whereby a person goes back and 
forth between her judgements and her avowed moral principles, until coherence is 
reached.
There have been attempts to discuss how such a theory would work in practice 
[47], including the practice of health care delivery. Reflective equilibrium requires 
institutions or HCNs to engage with the values or principles they support to see 
whether they apply these principles consistently and whether they are coherent with 
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other values and principles they avow. If principles are found not to be applied con-
sistently, equilibrium must be restored by changing the institution’s or network’s 
stance in particular cases or by changing the principle. Likewise when two val-
ues are incoherent, this requires the changing or adjusting one of these values. If 
one changes the principle, one has to consider the consequence of that change and 
whether this effects the coherence of the new principles with other principles. Hence 
searching for an equilibrium is a continuous project.
To indicate how reflective equilibrium might work, we provide a hypothetical 
example. Imagine, for example, a network that includes multiple hospitals and in 
which two of those hospitals uphold two principles. The first hospital values the 
principle: within our HCN, patients should always be given the best possible care. 
The second hospital avows the principle: competent patients must always be able 
to make their own autonomous choices regarding their own care. Within the net-
work context, these two principles might be mutually exclusive. Imagine one health 
care institution within that network (institution A) specialises in a specific type of 
heart surgery and in quality audits has markedly better performance scores. If some 
patients in need of that heart surgery want to have this surgery done in institution B 
within that network (e.g. because this hospital is nearer to their residence), this can 
cause a problem of coherence. Either the network allows these patients to have the 
surgery done in institution B (thereby failing to provide the best possible care) or 
they require these patients to have the surgery done in institution A (thereby limiting 
these patients’ autonomous choice). Following reflective equilibrium the network 
has to address this incoherence. For example, they might attempt to address the qual-
ity differences and try to make sure the specific heart surgery is done with the same 
standard of care in all institutions (e.g. by buying equipment or providing additional 
training for the surgeons of the other institutions). In such a scenario patients could 
be able to choose and receive the best care. However, in practice doing away with 
this quality gap is far from easy and might require a significant amount of resources. 
Second, the network might choose to adopt the following principle: within our HCN, 
patients should always be given the best possible care that is respectful of their 
autonomous choices. This would alleviate the inconsistency between the two insti-
tutions’ principles, as patients having the surgery done in institution B would not 
receive the best possible care, but they would receive the best possible care consid-
ering their autonomous choice of not going to institution A. As such, this principle 
could be a good compromise for both institutions as it combines and balances qual-
ity concerns (particularly relevant for one institution) and autonomy (particularly 
relevant for another institution).
An advantage is that reflective equilibrium starts from network members’ own 
values and moral beliefs, but then tests these, primarily, for internal coherence and 
consistency. Instead of choosing one of the mutually exclusive principles, this equi-
librium approach requires institutions to find a way to make these principles consist-
ent with each other (e.g. by slightly altering one’s avowed values as an institution). 
Reflective equilibrium does not lead to moral relativism but should, on the contrary, 
lead to a more coherent set of moral judgements and a more consistent application 
of moral principles.
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Discussion
As argued above, we focus on compromise as a process. Essential is that in both 
models discussed above, institutions do not alter their beliefs in response to another 
party with an opposing view (which might be considered ‘caving in’) but rather as a 
result of a mutually undertaken deliberation process.
However, there are red lights to bear in mind. First, as this method does not 
require a definite choice, it might also be perceived as a way to delay ethical choice 
or even to avoid making any ethical choice at all. If the method is used in this way, 
it falls victim to the same critique that was brought against pragmatism, namely 
that the method resolves ethical conflict by failing to address the ethical issue. Sec-
ond, the method does not stipulate who should take part in this discourse. Imagine 
a case where all hospitals in a large geographical area form a HCN. This would 
have important ramifications for people living in that area (e.g. regarding access to 
health care). Hence one might wonder whether, considering their interest, these peo-
ple should play a role in this discourse as stakeholder and what that role should be. 
Third, within health care various different ‘discourses’ exist (e.g. an economical dis-
course, an ideological discourse, etc.). When forming a HCN, a dominant partner in 
that network might control the discourse being used, thereby exerting considerable 
power over the network and its various partners [6]. Hence what should be an open 
debate, can be hijacked by one of the network partners.
Consensus and Compromise: The Search for a Common Ground
In the previous sections we have examined models which constitute the various dif-
ferent approaches to achieve consensus or compromise. In doing so, we have some-
what abstracted from the question what the content of moral consensus could be. In 
this final section, we will therefore focus on this issue. Imagine two or more health 
care institutions are intent on forming a partnership or HCN and are trying to work 
through their moral differences. They might aim at resolving moral differences one 
dilemma at a time or they might try to design a more comprehensive (normative) 
framework.
Institutions might attempt to resolve arising ethical conflicts on a case by case 
basis, focussing on particular solutions on which everyone agrees. We have argued 
that although such an approach might be tempting from a practical point of view, it 
often comes at an ethical cost. Ad hoc decisions might result in a net loss of overall 
fairness or justice within the HCN. In many cases to guarantee justice, some form 
of consensus or compromise is necessary. Concerning the content of consensus or 
compromise, we will examine various candidates that range from (1) broad to spe-
cific and from (2) vague to applicable.
A first obvious candidate are institutional moral values. Most, if not all, HCNs 
have particular avowed values such as, for example, patient centeredness and integ-
rity. Such values can be argued to be both broad and vague. They are broad as they 
cover a great deal of cases or practices, which might make them an ideal candidate 
for a consensus approach as members of a HCN might be able to avow the same 
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broad value. However, there may be some concerns regarding their immediate use-
fulness and applicability in resolving potential conflicts. Values tend to be vague 
and their application in concrete situations often requires substantial interpretation. 
This is, of course a potential cause of conflicts within or between the partners of the 
HCNs, in which case not much is gained by avowing shared values.
HCNs who agree on particular values could, of course, attempt to remedy the 
vagueness by, for example, translating certain values into particular goals or com-
mitments. The value of ‘best quality for all patients’ could be translated into very 
concrete health care goals (e.g. a particular reduction of patient readmissions or an 
increase in patient reported quality of care). The advantage of such commitments is 
that they are concrete and it can be the topic of empirical study which measures best 
help to achieve these goals. The past decades monitoring and evaluating hospital 
performances and quality of care have been high on the agenda. Evidence based 
medicine has been praised as an important tool in the ethical management of hospi-
tals [8] and as an important tool in bioethical decision-making [9]. Of course, trans-
lating values into concrete goals or commitments in no way guarantees consensus or 
compromise. First, health care institutions might disagree on what the specific goals 
should be. Second, there can still be disagreement on the correct way to achieve 
such concrete goals or commitments.
Formal ethical rules or an ethical code hold the opposite end of the spectrum 
as they are applicable and specific. Ethical rules are drafted to provide clear and 
unequivocal guidance for action in particular situations, thereby providing clarity. 
HCNs are often formalised in contracts or in the formulation of a joint mission state-
ment. Ethical rules and other arrangements could be part of that contract or mis-
sions statement. However, as with values, their advantage in applicability may play 
against them when it concerns broad and flexible use of the moral framework. Rules 
are specific to the situation to which they apply and the act they proscribe, which 
may be problematic. First, no set of rules is likely to cover all cases or dilemmas that 
may arise. For such cases, HCNs may still require a more broad moral framework to 
fall back on. Second, rules are often straightforward whereas actual cases are com-
plex. Being overly attached to particular rules can amount to a formalistic applica-
tion of rules devoid of any ethical reflection. For this reason, MacIntyre famously 
referred to regulation and rules as a mere ‘substitute for morality’ [32].
Principles seem to combine the best of both worlds as they are drafted to be both 
broad and applicable. The general idea is that by reverting to principles, one has a 
framework that can give clear guidance, while being broad enough to remain atten-
tive to complex cases. Rules can only be followed or broken, but principles can be 
balanced. The most well-known theory within biomedical ethics is of course Beau-
champ and Childress’ ‘Principlism’ [5]. Much, however, depends on how such prin-
ciples are formulated. When formulated vaguely, they are akin to values and suffer 
from the same problems. If formulated too specifically, they are akin to rules, with 
all associated problems.
However, any set of principles needs a theoretical framework concerning how 
principles should be applied, how they should be balanced or prioritised. Beau-
champ and Childress’ principlist framework is famous for claiming that no principle 
has automatic priority over another principle. However, when principles conflict, a 
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decision should be made. If there is ad-hoc or unsystematic balancing of moral prin-
ciples, this can clearly result in injustice or unfairness. Hence, HCNs coming to a 
consensus or compromise on particular principles, should also have a method for 
operating these principles.
As was discussed above, another possibility is that within a HCN there is 
agreement on formal ethical procedures or processes. This outcome is some-
what the odd one out as it resists definite classification in the broad-specific and 
vague-applicable range given above. Procedures might be considered broad as a 
great variety of different dilemmas can be inputted into this process, but they also 
describe a particularly specific process. To some degree processes are also vague 
as they describe the process rather than the outcome, but they generate solutions 
to ethical issues and are thus applicable. As such, processes might cover the entire 
spectrum. Focussing on the process implies a commitment to profound and criti-
cal ethical reflection and it requires one to engage with one’s own beliefs or those 
of others in an attempt to resolve normative conflict. Of course, there may also 
be potential problems. Discussing and deliberating is time-consuming and thus 
not always workable. Procedures and protocols need some sort of stopping point 
at which case the discussion results in an outcome. Also, for members of a HCN 
providing medical care this might not provide the necessary guidance or security 
in their day-to-day work. Hence amidst the deliberation and discussion, practical 
outcome must also be guaranteed.
Conclusions
We have argued it is becoming more and more common for health care institutions 
to collaborate in HCNs. These collaborations can be the result of governmental 
policy or other considerations. Whatever the reason might be, these networks will 
often comprise of institutions with a—to some degree—different moral identity. 
In this paper three ways to deal with such differences in identity and moral beliefs 
or values were examined. Which way is to be preferred, depends on the circum-
stances and the context in which these networks are formed.
A first way is the way of pragmatism or ‘muddling through’ which involves 
dealing with dilemmas by focussing on solutions on which agreement exists. For 
some networks, this way might be appealing. However, there is a risk that this 
leads to avoiding ethical debate or reflection. Another way is to use a consen-
sus model when building HCNs, which involves focussing on those values and 
principles on which consensus exists. For networks involving institutions with 
overlapping moral beliefs, this approach might be useful. The risk with such a 
model is that the content of consensus might, in cases of moral debate, by very 
vague and thin. To what extent this consensus can thus always serve as a stable 
base for interorganizational collaboration is questionable. A third more contro-
versial, route is through moral compromise which involves mutual concessions. 
Although moral claims are often argued to be non-negotiable, we have argued 
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that compromise might nevertheless be reached through a deliberative process 
involving willing partners.
In sum, there are various possible grounds for consensus and compromise. None 
of these form the universal gold standard. It is clear, however, that they have their 
particular characteristics and disadvantages. Values, rules, codes of ethics, princi-
ples and procedures do not automatically and in themselves guarantee justice and 
fairness. If health care institutions come together to form a HCN, they will have to 
come to some degree of agreement on values, rules, principles or procedures, but 
also to take action to make them work in practice. Values may need more concrete 
content, whereas rules need a mechanism that allows for flexibility. Principles need 
a method for applying and balancing them.
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